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Abstract—The adversarial attack methods based on gradient
information can adequately find the perturbations, that is, the
combinations of rewired links, thereby reducing the effectiveness
of the deep learning model based graph embedding algorithms,
but it is also easy to fall into a local optimum. Therefore, this
paper proposes a Momentum Gradient Attack (MGA) against
the GCN model, which can achieve more aggressive attacks
with fewer rewiring links. Compared with directly updating
the original network using gradient information, integrating
the momentum term into the iterative process can stabilize
the updating direction, which makes the model jump out of
poor local optimum and enhance the method with stronger
transferability. Experiments on node classification and com-
munity detection methods based on three well-known network
embedding algorithms show that MGA has a better attack effect
and transferability.
Index Terms—Momentum gradient, adversarial attack, graph
embedding, node classification, community detection
I. INTRODUCTION
NOWADAYS many systems can be modeled as graphs,such as social networks [1]–[3], biological networks [4],
[5], traffic networks [6], [7]. With the help of graph em-
bedding, especially some deep learning models, nodes and
links in the network can be represented as low-dimensional
vectors, based on which downstream tasks can be easily
implemented. Such approaches have achieved great success
in various applications such as node classification [8]–[10],
community detection [11]–[13] and link prediction [14]–[16].
However, it has been found that deep models are vulnerable
to adversarial attacks [17]–[21]. In the areas such as computer
vision [22]–[25] and recommendation system [26], [27], the
adversarial attacks against deep learning models are considered
as a severe security problem, because small perturbations
may fool the methods and consequently produce completely
wrong output. Recently, the adversarial attacks against network
algorithms also are carried out to study the robustness of
network algorithms [28], [29], by rewiring a small number
of links in the original network. Some even study on using
the adversarial attack methods to solve privacy problems, that
is, to protect certain sensitive information of the network from
being leaked by graph mining methods [30], [31].
At present, many adversarial attacks on network algorithms
directly based on gradient information, i.e., by calculating the
partial derivatives of the target loss function to the element of
adjacency matrix [28], [30], [32]. In this way, the generated
adversarial network can easily drop into poor local maxima
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and thus overfit the model, leading to lower transferability
across models.
Adopting the momentum method [33], which is a technique
to accelerating gradient descent by accumulating a velocity
vector in the gradient descent directions, is a widely used
method to avoid inadequate local solutions [34]–[36]. In
computer vision, many studies on the momentum method
have been proposed to improve the gradient method [37]–
[40]. Moreover, it was used in adversarial attacks of image
classification algorithms to further improve the success rates
of black-box attacks [41]. In order to further improve the
attack effectiveness of the gradient-based adversarial attack
against the Graph Convolutional Network (GCN) model [30],
this paper proposes a momentum gradient attack (MGA) that
uses the gradient momentum to update the adversarial network.
Specifically, we use momentum to produce a new updating
direction by adding velocity vector into the gradient of the loss
function, which can stabilize the updating direction and make
the attack robust to different models. The main contributions
of the proposed MGA are as follows.
• As a new adversarial attack against the network al-
gorithms, MGA is superior to several state-of-the-art
adversarial attacks under the same scale of perturbation,
including GradArgmax [29], RL-S2V [29], NETTACK
[32], and Fast Gradient Attack (FGA) [30].
• MGA has strong transitivity, and adversarial networks
generated based on GCN can also be used to effectively
attack other deep models, including DeepWalk [42],
node2vec [43] and Graph-GAN [44].
• Compared with FGA [30], MGA performs better and is
more robust in the absence of some structural information
of the original network, so it is more practical.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we
review the existing adversarial attack methods on graph data.
In Sec. III, we briefly introduce the GCN and FGA. In Sec. IV,
we introduce MGA method in details, including white-box
and black-box adversarial attacks. In Sec. V, we empirically
evaluate MGA on multiple tasks, and compare the attack
performance on several real-world networks. In Sec. VI, we
conclude the paper and highlight future research directions.
II. RELATED WORK
Recently, adversarial attack on networks has attracted a
lot of attention and many algorithms have been proposed.
In particular, for community detection, Nagaraja [45] first
introduced a community hiding algorithm, where they added
links based on centrality values to change the community
structure. Waniek et al. [46] proposed a heuristic method
named Disconnect Internally, Connect Externally (DICE),
which deletes the links within the same communities while
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2adds the links across different communities. Valeria et al. [47]
proposed the safeness-based method, which adds and deletes
specific links, leading to the maximum increase of safeness.
Chen et al. [48] further introduced a community detection
attack algorithm based on genetic algorithm, which treated
modularity Q as fitness function. For link prediction, Zheleva
et al. [49] proposed the link re-identification attack to protect
sensitive links from the released data. Link perturbation is a
common technique in those early researches that data publisher
can randomly modify links on the original network to protect
the sensitive links from being identified. Fard et al. [50]
introduced a subgraph wise perturbation in directed networks
to randomize the destination of a link within subgraphs so as
to protect sensitive links. They further proposed a neighbor-
hood randomization mechanism to probabilistically randomize
the destination of a link within a local neighborhood [51].
For link prediction, Yu et al. [31] designed evolutionary
perturbations based on genetic algorithm and estimation of
distribution algorithm to degrade the popular link prediction
method Resource Allocation Index (RA). And they found that
although the evolutionary perturbations are designed to against
RA, it is also effective against other link-prediction methods.
For network embedding, Xuan et al. [52] proposed Euclidean
Distance Attack (EDA), a genetic algorithm based network
embedding attack method, which focuses on disturbing the
Euclidean distance between nodes in the embedding space.
Moreover, due the great success of many graph deep learn-
ing frameworks, e.g., Graph Convolutional Networks (GCN),
several deep learning based attacks have been proposed re-
cently. Bojchevski and Gu¨nnemann [28] attacked the embed-
ding model by maximizing the random walk model based loss
function, and they demonstrated that the generated adversarial
network has strong transferability. Dai et al. [29] proposed
a reinforcement learning based attack, which uses a hierar-
chical Q-function to reduce its time complexity. Zugner et
al. [32] proposed NETTACK, which maximizes the difference
in the log-probabilities of the target node before and after
the attack. This method not only considers rewiring links,
but also modifies nodes’ features to generate unnoticeable
perturbations. Depending on the gradient information, Chen
et al. [30] proposed the Fast Gradient Attack (FGA), which
directly uses the gradient of adjacency matrix to iteratively
update the adversarial network. By using this method, the
embedding of target node can be changed significantly through
rewiring a small number of links, so as to greatly affect
the downstream algorithms based on embedding. However,
although it is relatively fast, FGA easily falls into the poor
local optimum since it uses the gradient information directly.
III. BACKGROUND
A. Double-Layer GCN model
Since the end-to-end node classification model GCN [53]
has great performance in node classifications, we generate
adversarial networks based on gradient information of GCN
same as the work in [30], [32]. Given a network G and the
feature of nodes X . Denoting A as the adjacency matrix of the
network, the forward propagation of GCN model of a single
hidden layer then is defined as follow:
Y ′(A) = f(A¯σ(A¯XW0)W1), (1)
where A¯ = D˜−
1
2 A˜D˜−
1
2 , A˜ = A + IN is the self-connected
form of undirected network G after adding the identity matrix
IN to A, D˜ii =
∑
j A˜ij is the diagonal degree matrix of A˜;
W0 ∈ R|V |×H and W1 ∈ RH×|F | are the input-to-hidden and
hidden-to-output weight matrices, respectively, with the node
set V , category set F and hidden layer of H feature maps;
f and σ are the softmax function and Relu active function,
respectively. For semi-supervised multi-label classification on
GCN, we define the loss function based on the cross-entropy
error over all labeled nodes:
L = −
|VL|∑
l=1
|F |∑
h=1
Ylh ln(Y
′
lh(A)), (2)
where VL is the set of nodes with ground truth labels, Y is
the real label matrix with Ylh = 1 if node vl belongs to h-th
category and Ylh = 0 otherwise, and Y ′(A) is the output of
the model defined by Eq. (1).
The weight matrices W0 and W1 are updated based on
gradient descent, so that the GCN model is continuously
optimized and the node classification performance is steadily
improved. As we can see, in Eq. (2), the adjacency matrix A
is another critical variable in the loss function. Therefore, we
can implement network attacks, that is, to reduce the accuracy
of nodes classification, by modifying the adjacency matrix A
based on its gradient information.
B. Fast Gradient Attack method
In this subsection, the FGA method [30], which is a
gradient-based adversarial attack method against the GCN
model, is briefly introduced. Based on the trained GCN model,
the target loss function Lt of target node vt is defined as
Eq. (3). It represents the difference between the predicted label
and the real one of the target node vt.
Lt = −
|F |∑
k=1
Ytk ln(Y
′
tk(A)), (3)
which represents the difference between the predicted label
and the real one of the target node vt. The larger value of target
loss function corresponds to the worse prediction result. The
basic link gradient matrix g¯ is represented by Eq. (4).
g¯ij =
∂Lt
∂Aij
. (4)
where Aij and g¯ij is the element of adjacency matrix and link
gradient matrix respectively.
The primary link gradient matrix g¯ is symmetrized by
Eq. (5) to obtain the initial Link Gradient Network (LGN)
g since the adjacent matrix of an undirected network is
symmetry.
gij = gji =
{ g¯ij+g¯ji
2 i 6= j
0 i = j
. (5)
3TABLE I: The definitions of symbols.
Symbol Definition
G = (V,E) the original network with nodes V and links E
Gˆ = (V, Eˆ) adversarial network with nodes V and updated links Eˆ
A/Aˆ the adjacency matrix of original network/adversarial network
L the loss function of the GCN model
Lt the loss function for target node vt of the GCN model
Y/Y ′ the label confidence list before/after the attack
vt target node
K the maximum number of iterations
Gˆk/Aˆk the kth adversarial network/adjacency matrix
g¯/g link gradient matrix/network
gˆk the kth momentum of link gradient matrix
µ the decay factor
θ the sign function
In initial LGN g, each pair of nodes has a positive or neg-
ative gradient value. Note that adding/deleting links between
pairs of nodes with larger magnitude gradients may cause the
target loss function to change rapidly. Therefore, FGA method
add links between the pairs of nodes with maximum positive
link gradient, and delete links between the pairs of nodes with
maximum negative link gradient.
IV. METHOD
In this paper, we design MGA as a new attack method
to generate adversarial networks based on the trained GCN
model. Due to the ability of momentum term in the iterative
process to stabilize the updating direction, MGA can success-
fully fool white-box model (GCN model) as well as black-
box models (i.e. DeepWalk, node2vec, GraphGAN, etc). In
the realization of adversarial attack, we first choose the target
nodes, and then generate adversarial networks to hide the
selected target nodes under certain network analysis methods.
The flowchart of MGA is shown in Fig 1. For convenience,
the definitions of symbols used in Sec. IV-B are briefly
summarized in TABLE I.
A. Problem Definition
We first give the definition of adversarial attack on networks
as follows.
DEFINITION 1 (Adversarial attack). Given the original net-
work G = (V,E), where V and E are the set of nodes
and links, and the adversarial network Gˆ = (V, Eˆ) which
is generated by rewiring some edges of original network G.
Generally we can use a network analysis model f to get the
analysis results f(G) and f(Gˆ), respectively. The purpose of
adversarial attack is to fool the network analysis model f by
adversarial network Gˆ, which can be formulated as:
arg max
G¯
φ(f(G), f(Gˆ)), (6)
s.t.
∑
i<j
|Aij − Aˆij | ≤ ρ (7)
where ρ is the size of adversarial perturbation and φ is a
function measuring the difference between f(G) and f(Gˆ).
B. MGA method
To generate adversarial network for target node vt from
the original network, after the definition of loss function Lt
Eq. (3), the network attack methods generate the adversarial
network by solving the following constrained optimization
problem:
arg max
Aˆ
Lt(Aˆ), s.t.
∑
i<j
|Aij − Aˆij | ≤ ρ, (8)
where ρ is the size of adversarial perturbation.
In MGA method, we modify one link during each iteration,
and stop the process when the maximum allowed number of
modified links is reached. The kth iteration can be described
by the following steps.
Firstly with Aˆ0 = A, we can generate the (k − 1)th LGN
gk−1 using the adversarial network adjacency matrix Aˆk−1
based on Eq. (4) and Eq. (5). Then, we can update the kth Link
Momentum Network (LMN) gˆk by accumulating the velocity
vector in the gradient direction using Eq. (9).
gˆkij = µ · gˆk−1ij +
gk−1ij
||gk−1||1 , (9)
where µ is the decay factor which in the range of [0, 1].
We update the (k− 1)th adversarial network by modifying
the link (vi, vj) of the maximum absolute link momentum in
the kth momentum LMN gˆk.
Aˆkij = Aˆ
k−1
ij + θ(gˆ
k
ij), (10)
arg max
(vi,vj)∈Ω
|gˆk−1ij |, (11)
where Ω is the set of all pairs of nodes except vi = vj , and
θ(gˆkij) represents the sign of momentum of the selected pair
of nodes (vi, vj).
The sign of the momentum is a basic element in LMN which
represent the ways of the modifying links, that is, delete or
add the links between the selected node pairs. More specially,
a positive momentum means to add the links; otherwise, it
means to delete the links.
θ(gˆkij) =
{
1 gˆkij > 0
−1 else (12)
The whole steps of the adversarial network generator is
described by the following steps.
1) Train the GCN model on original network G.
2) Initialize number of iterations k=1 and the adjacency
matrix of the adversarial network by Aˆ0 = A
3) Construct the LGN gk−1 based on the Aˆk−1 via Eq. (4)
and Eq. (5).
4) Construct the LMN gˆk−1 based on the gk−1 via Eq. (9).
5) Select the pair of nodes (vi, vj) of the maximum absolute
link momentum in gˆk.
6) Update the adjacency matrix Aˆk via Eq. (10) and Eq. (11)
7) If the maximum number of iterations is not reached (k <
K)go to step 3); otherwise, k = k+ 1 and go to step 8).
8) Generate the final adversarial network GˆK based on the
adjacency matrix AˆK .
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Fig. 1: The framework of MGA, which consists of seven steps. First, input original network to train GCN model; second,
calculate the gradients of each link for the loss function; third, calculate the momentum based on gradient information; fourth,
sort the absolute of momentum; fifth, select the largest one for updating the original network; sixth, recalculate the gradient
information based on updated network; finally, gain adversarial network after K times of updates and various node classification
algorithms are performed on the adversarial network to validate the attack effect of MGA.
V. EXPERIMENTS
A. Experimental Setting
Here, we will describe the experimental setting. To testify
the effectiveness of MGA, we compare it with some state-of-
the-art baseline methods by performing several tasks, includ-
ing node classification attack, community detection attack and
anti-defense test on several well-known datasets. The decay
factor µ used in the experiment is 0.5.
1) Datasets: The Details of three datasets used in the
experiment are presented in TABLE II.
• Pol.Blogs: This dataset is compiled by Adamic and
Glance [54], which show the political leaning of blog
directories. The blogs are divided into two classes and the
links between blogs were automatically extracted from
the front pages of the blogs. It contains 1,490 blogs and
19,090 links in total.
• Cora: This dataset is a typical paper citation network in
the computer science domain with the papers divided into
seven classes. It contains 2,708 paper and 5,429 links in
total [55].
• Citeseer: This dataset consists of 3,312 scientific publi-
cations classified into six classes. The citation network
consists of 4,732 citation links which represents the
citation relationships.
TABLE II: The basic statistics of the three network datasets.
Dataset #Nodes #Links #Classes
Pol.Blogs 1,490 19,090 2
Cora 2,708 5,429 7
Citeseer 3,312 4,732 6
2) Baselines: Note that our experimental setting is the same
as FGA method [30]. So in the Sec. V-B, we only show the
comparison results with FGA algorithm, and FGA algorithm
has shown that its effect is better than other algorithms,
including NETTACK [32], RL-S2V [29] and GraArgmax [29].
• GraArgmax [29]. GradArgmax greedily select the links
that are most likely to cause the change to the loss
function based on gradient information.
• RL-S2V [29]. RL-S2V is a reinforcement learning based
attack method which decomposes the quadratic action
space by hierarchical method. It use Q-learning to learn
the attack procedure which parameterized by S2V [56].
We set the iteration number ∆ = 200 for this method.
• NETTACK [32]. NETTACK iteratively select the links
which can maximize the changes of the surrogate model’s
results before and after the attack. Note that it only
rewires links which can preserve the graphs degree dis-
tribution and feature co-occurrences.
• FGA [30]. FGA directly uses the gradient of adjacency
matrix to generates adversarial network iteratively. In
each iteration, it selects candidate node piars with maxi-
mum gradient to update the adversarial network.
3) Performance metrics: In order to compare the trans-
ferability of different adversarial attack methods, we use the
generated adversarial networks to attack other network embed-
ding approaches including DeepWalk [42], Node2vec [43] and
GraphGAN [44]. And we also use the following two metrics
to compare the effectiveness of these attack methods.
• ASR. The average success rate is the ratio of misclassifi-
cation of target nodes by changing no more than ρ links.
In the experiment, the perturbation size ρ is varied from
5TABLE III: The attack effects, in terms of ASR and AML, obtained by different attack methods on various network embedding
methods and multiple datasets. Here, ASR is obtained by rewiring 20 links.
Dataset NEM
ASR (%) AML
MGA FGA MGA FGA
Unlimited Direct Indirect Unlimited Direct Indirect Unlimited Direct Indirect Unlimited Direct Indirect
Pol.Blogs
GCN 100 97.87 34.04 87.87 85.74 25.53 3.23 3.74 16.09 8.42 8.82 17.61
DeepWalk 97.96 91.67 6.25 84.26 81.66 6.25 6.76 7.19 19.11 9.84 10.93 19.20
node2vec 97.96 91.67 5.15 84.34 81.83 0.00 6.71 7.08 19.30 9.72 10.16 20.00
GraphGAN 98.63 89.58 5.48 81.21 80.24 0.00 6.72 7.15 19.16 9.41 11.02 20.00
Average 98.64 92.70 12.73 84.42 82.37 9.95 5.86 6.29 18.42 9.35 10.23 19.20
Cora
GCN 100 100 84.38 100 100 88.28 1.74 1.85 8.91 2.54 3.21 6.77
DeepWalk 100 100 85.98 100 97.22 81.55 3.27 3.03 9.01 5.61 6.27 10.59
node2vec 100 100 85.51 100 100 84.00 3.14 3.10 8.71 5.66 5.58 9.52
GraphGAN 100 100 83.80 100 96.00 84.62 3.17 3.22 8.70 5.65 6.40 11.02
Average 100 100 77.75 100 98.31 84.61 2.83 2.80 7.89 4.87 5.37 9.48
Citeseer
GCN 100 100 94.23 100 100 91.36 2.53 2.40 7.51 3.52 3.88 7.69
DeepWalk 100 100 84.48 100 100 100 5.25 5.17 7.64 5.68 6.06 7.76
node2vec 100 100 85.34 100 100 98.21 5.09 4.97 7.69 5.62 6.50 7.75
GraphGAN 100 100 84.02 100 97.89 93.15 5.04 5.55 7.98 5.91 6.67 8.18
Average 100 100 87.02 100 99.47 95.68 4.48 4.52 7.71 5.18 5.78 7.85
1 to 20. The higher ASR corresponds to the better attack
effect.
• AML. The average number of rewiring links to success-
fully misclassify a target node. In the experiment, the
maximum number of rewiring links is 20, i.e. , when a
target node can’t be misclassified by rewiring 20 links,
we set the number as 20. The lower AML corresponds
to the better attack effect.
B. Node Classification Attack
Three node classification attack methods are carried out in
this subsection. For each method, we do uniform attack, hub-
nodes attack and bridge-nodes attack, respectively.
• Direct attack: The attack is directed at the target node;
that is, the redistributed link is limited to the neighbor
link of the target node in the network.
• Indirect attack: The attack is located on a link that is
not connected to the target node to make the attack more
covert.
• Unlimited attack: Generate perturbations without con-
sidering whether they are around the target nodes or not.
We randomly choose 10% labeled nodes as training and
validation sets, respectively. The rest 80% nodes are used for
testing. For all the network embedding methods, the vector
dimension is set to 128, the number of walks per node is set
to 10, the length of walk is set to 80 and the size of context
window is set to 10. The nodes that may be misclassified by
the GCN model or logistic regression classifier without attack
will not be considered as the target nodes.
1) uniform attack: The uniform attack experiments, which
select 20 nodes from each category as the target nodes,
were carried out to verify the general attacking effect of the
strategies. The results are shown in Tables III and Figs. 2. It
can be seen that, in most cases, whether on ASR or AML,
MGA achieves better attack results than FGA. Interestingly,
such superiority is even more distinct on Pol.Blogs dataset,
which has more links and larger attack solutions space.
Attacking GCN will get better attack performance than
attacking other network embedding algorithms, since MGA
is developed based on GCN. However, when attacking other
network embedding algorithms, the performance of MGA is
also better than other attack methods, which proves that MGA
has stronger transferability. Even in indirect attacks, MGA
performed quite well on the Cora and Citeseer datasets, with
ASR exceeding 80% in most cases.
2) Hub-node attack: There are many indicators of concen-
tration that reflect the importance of nodes in the network,
including degree centrality, closeness, betweenness [57]. In
this subsection, we select 40 nodes with highest degree
centrality [58] as hub nodes and consider them as target
nodes. The results presented in Tables IV show that, MGA
still outperforms other methods, and unlimited MGA outper-
forms direct or indirect MGA in most cases. Besides, due to
the high degree centrality of target nodes, compared to the
uniform attack shown in Tables III, the effectiveness of all
the attack methods are reduced, especially on the Pol.Blogs
dataset whose hub-nodes have higher degree value than other
datasets. In addition, we can also find that the transferability
of indirected MGA decreases most when attacking hub-node,
which may because the target nodes have more neighborhood
make their embeddings much more robust and in different
models, links far away from hub nodes influence those nodes
is different.
3) Bridge-node attack: In each network, 40 nodes with
the highest betweenness centrality [59], [60], were selected
as bridge nodes. Different from the degree centrality, the
betweenness measures the degree to which a node is located
on the shortest path between two other nodes [61], [62],
and consequently considers the global network structure. The
attack results are presented in Table V. Similar to uniform
attacks and hub-node attacks, MGA performs better than other
methods in the unlimited and directed attacks, and all methods
perform best in the unlimited attacks. Meanwhile, it is found
that it is easier to attack the bridge nodes than the hub nodes,
which may be because the degree of the bridge nodes is much
smaller than the hub nodes.
Overall, by comparing the results in Table III-Table V,
we can find that MGA is useful in attacking different types
of nodes, which indicates that integrating momentum terms
into the iterative process can enhance the attack effect and
transferability. In addition, some indirect attacks are also
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Fig. 2: ASR of different attack methods of perturbation size γ for different dataset.
effective.
C. Selected Links Analysis
In this section, we will explore the reason why the links
selected by MGA have a greater impact on node classification
compared to others. We calculate the four metrics value to
evaluate the selected links. For the γ-th selected links, we
calculate the sum of the its related node degree D(γ) and
its’s betweenness B(γ). Further more, we also calculate the
average distance As(γ) (resp., Ad(γ)), which denote the
average distance between target node and the labeled nodes
which belong to the same class(resp., different classes) after
update the γ links. More specifically, these metrics are defined
as follows.
D(γ) =
Eγ∑
e=(u,v)
du + dv
nt
, (13)
where Eγ = {e1γ , e2γ , · · · , entγ } is the set of γ-th selected links
for nt target nodes. Further more du and dv is the degree of
node u and v before update those links respectively.
B(γ) =
∑
e∈Eγ
∑
u,v∈V
σ(u, v|e)/σ(u, v)
nt
, (14)
where V is the node set in the graph, σ(u, v) represents the
total number of shortest paths between nodes u and v, and
σ(u, v|e) represents the number of shortest paths through the
link e.
As(γ) =
∑
vt∈T
∑
u∈Ct Dγ(u, vt)/nCt
nt
, (15)
Ad(γ) =
∑
vt∈T
∑
u/∈Ct Dγ(u, vt)/n¯Ct
nt
, (16)
where D(u, vt) is the distance between target node vt and
node u after update the γ links, and Ct is the class which target
node vt belongs to. Furthermore, the number of nodes which
belong or not belong to class Ct is nCt and n¯Ct respectively.
From Fig. 3, We can find the average betweenness B can’t
be used to judge the result of node classification, but we
can generally conclude that the lower the average degree D,
the better the result of classification will be. This may be
because modifying the links on the nodes with small degree
value has more influence on those nodes than modifying links
on nodes with large degree value. The NETTACK algorithm
significantly increases As and decreases Ad, while MGA,
FGA, RL-S2V and GradArgmax don’t increase As. This is
because those methods rarely delete links. We can also find
that MGA and FGA both decreases the maximum amplitude
Ad as much as possible and ensure that As does not decrease
much. Considering that the effects of MGA and FGA are better
than NETTACK, we believe that the priority of lowering Ad
is greater than increasing As.
D. Community Deception
Community detection is aim to find community structure by
maximizing cluster quality measures such as modularity [63],
[64]. Similar to node classification, community detection also
labels each node, but most of them are unsupervised. In this
subsection, experiments are performed to study the effect of
MGA on community detection methods. Community decep-
tion [45]–[47] is strive to hide target community from being
discovered by community detection algorithms. We first use
attack methods to generate the adversarial networks and then
use two community detection algorithms and a combination
of network embedding methods and K-means to detect the
communities. The two community detection algorithms used
in this subsection are introduced as follows
• LPA [65]. Firstly each vertex has its own label and then
update its label by choosing the most frequent label of
its neighbor until the labels don’t change. This algorithm
has randomness which runs in time O(E).
• Louvain [66]. A modularity based algorithm which can
generate a hierarchical community structure by compress-
ing the communities as new nodes and its runs in time
O(|V | log |V |).
The datasets we used is described as follow.
• The USA political books [67]: The network represents
co-purchasing of US politics books around the time of the
2004 presidential election. The network has 105 books
and 441 links in total, and the books are classified as
conservative, liberal, and neutral.
• Dolphin social network [68]: The social network repre-
sents the common interactions of 62 dolphins which live
7TABLE IV: The hub-node attack effects, in terms of ASR and AML, obtained by different attack methods on various network
embedding methods and multiple datasets. Here, ASR is obtained by rewiring 20 links.
Dataset NEM
ASR (%) AML
MGA FGA MGA FGA
Unlimited Direct Indirect Unlimited Direct Indirect Unlimited Direct Indirect Unlimited Direct Indirect
Pol.Blogs
GCN 57.5 55.0 5.00 50.00 45.00 5.00 14.25 14.45 19.20 14.78 15.28 19.70
DeepWalk 47.50 50.00 2.50 53.85 50.00 2.50 16.12 15.95 19.55 16.00 16.82 19.77
node2vec 48.75 47.50 5.00 32.50 45.00 5.00 17.14 17.27 19.23 17.62 17.95 19.20
GraphGAN 49.17 40.00 2.50 25.00 17.50 2.50 17.07 17.27 19.36 18.68 18.77 19.52
Average 50.73 48.13 3.75 40.34 39.38 3.75 16.15 16.24 19.34 16.77 17.21 19.55
Cora
GCN 96.88 92.86 55.70 88.90 87.18 54.54 4.88 4.90 11.15 6.48 6.62 14.37
DeepWalk 93.90 87.50 47.22 85.63 80.50 43.75 6.61 7.75 13.29 7.57 7.73 13.70
node2vec 91.67 91.18 48.39 81.82 80.34 41.96 6.92 6.74 12.95 7.22 7.52 13.05
GraphGAN 93.75 87.50 53.13 84.36 82.57 48.74 7.44 7.97 12.19 8.00 8.15 12.98
Average 94.05 89.76 58.28 85.18 82.65 47.25 6.46 6.84 11.84 7.32 7.51 13.53
Citeseer
GCN 100 100 74.29 100 100 65.71 1.94 2.49 6.54 5.11 5.23 9.77
DeepWalk 94.44 91.89 18.92 88.89 86.89 8.33 9.81 11.62 18.51 10.67 12.14 18.89
node2vec 93.15 90.41 17.81 86.11 88.89 13.51 9.74 11.59 18.56 13.08 12.14 18.03
GraphGAN 91.74 89.91 18.02 89.19 88.89 5.56 10.16 11.50 18.20 13.47 11.95 19.17
Average 94.83 93.05 32.26 91.05 91.17 23.28 7.91 9.30 15.45 10.58 10.37 16.47
TABLE V: The bridge-node attack effects, in terms of ASR and AML, obtained by different attack methods on various network
embedding methods and multiple datasets. Here, ASR is obtained by rewiring 20 links.
Dataset NEM
ASR (%) AML
MGA FGA MGA FGA
Unlimited Direct Indirect Unlimited Direct Indirect Unlimited Direct Indirect Unlimited Direct Indirect
Pol.Blogs
GCN 63.16 57.9 18.42 62.16 54.05 5.26 13.71 13.92 17.97 14.65 14.95 19.29
DeepWalk 41.54 44.74 7.84 36.84 36.84 7.89 16.97 16.84 18.83 17.08 17.61 18.82
node2vec 56.76 52.11 5.41 50.00 52.63 5.26 15.89 16.95 19.06 16.21 16.03 19.13
GraphGAN 39.47 36.84 5.26 30.77 25.79 5.26 14.13 17.16 19.37 17.92 18.25 19.37
Average 50.23 47.90 9.23 44.94 42.33 5.92 15.18 16.22 18.81 16.47 16.71 19.15
Cora
GCN 96.97 93.33 78.57 92.59 88.89 55.56 3.25 4.11 9.14 4.63 4.78 10.93
DeepWalk 93.75 90.32 41.16 93.75 90.32 28.12 7.31 8.55 14.52 7.91 8.03 16.03
node2vec 93.75 90.91 45.31 93.75 86.67 40.00 6.84 8.18 14.14 8.25 9.03 14.46
GraphGAN 93.25 90.32 42.71 90.62 90.00 33.33 7.93 8.48 14.14 8.69 8.87 15.97
Average 94.43 91.22 51.94 92.68 88.97 39.25 6.33 7.33 12.99 7.37 7.68 14.35
Citeseer
GCN 100 100 93.75 96.97 96.97 66.67 2.03 2.03 5.50 4.94 5.03 11.61
DeepWalk 96.77 93.33 45.16 93.33 93.33 20.69 6.90 8.10 15.65 8.80 9.33 18.76
node2vec 95.00 93.55 42.62 93.33 90.32 26.67 6.97 7.87 16.39 9.63 9.06 16.27
GraphGAN 93.41 90.62 41.76 93.55 93.33 19.35 6.80 7.38 16.62 8.97 8.33 17.87
Average 96.30 94.38 55.82 94.30 93.49 33.35 5.68 6.35 13.54 8.09 7.94 16.13
D B
dAsA
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γ γ γ γ
Fig. 3: The information of selected links. (a) Node degree; (b) Betweenness; (c) The average distance of target nodes to the
same kind of nodes; (d) The average distance of target nodes to the different kinds of nodes.
off Doubtful Sound, New Zealand. The network has 159
links and can be divided into two parts.
In this subsection, we randomly choose 10% nodes from
each community as training and validation sets respectively.
The rest 80% nodes are used for testing. For all the network
embedding methods, the dimension of embedding vector is
set to 20 and other settings are consistent with Sec. V-B. As
an example, we visualize the attack effect of MGA on the
Dolphin network using node2vec and t-SNE [69], as shown
in Fig. 4. From Fig. 4 we can see that after the attack the
target nodes which originally belong to the blue community
are more closer to the red community than blue community,
while the other nodes still show a more distinct community
distribution.
Table VI shows the results of each algorithm on community
deception, from which we can see that MGA perform better
8Target node 10
Target node 10
(a) Before attack (b) After attack
Fig. 4: The visualization of target node attack obtained by
MGA, utilizing t-SNE algorithm, on Dolphin network. The
purple node represent the target node 10, which originally
belongs to the blue community. After the attack, it belongs to
the red community. Except the target node, the nodes of same
color still belongs to the same community detected by the fast
greedy algorithm [70]. (a) before attack; (b) after attack.
than other attack methods, suggesting that MGA is effective
for attacking community detection algorithms. Besides, the
effect of each algorithm on Pol.Book is slightly lower than that
on dolphins data set, suggesting that community deception is
still affected by the degree of target nodes.
E. Limited Knowledge
In the previous experiments, we have assumed full knowl-
edge of the input datasets, which may be unrealistic. In
practice, only part information of the dataset is available. This
raises the question of how MGA performs when knowledge is
limited. In this experiment, we consider two cases of limited
knowledge: the first is ensuring the 1-hop neighbors of the
target node and the rest links are randomly missing, and the
second is that all links are randomly. Due to it’s easy to attack
low-degree nodes, we randomly select 10% nodes as the target
nodes whose degrees are greater than the average value. Taking
the Pol.Blogs dataset as an example, the effect of MGA is
shown in Fig. 5.
From Fig. 5, we can see that MGA performs better than
FGA when knowledge is limited, especially in the case of
randomly missing. Besides, in the second case, the attack
effect of both two methods is significantly better than that
of the first case, suggesting that the target node is greatly
affected by its neighbors. Moreover, we can find that as the
missing probability increases, the attack effect of both methods
decreases but is not significant. This may be because low-
degree nodes are very vulnerable to attack, and only the target
nodes with moderate degree values may have different results
in different missing probability.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a network adversarial attack
algorithm MGA based on the momentum of gradient, which
can fool network analysis methods and make the target nodes
mis-analyzed, including node embedding, node classification
and community detection. In this method, we first use the
(a) (b)
γγ
A
S
R
(%
)
Fig. 5: The attack results of MGA and FGA when knowledge
is limited. In each missing case, the probability of missing
links is set to 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8. (a) Ensuring the 1-hop
neighbors; (b) Randomly missing.
original network to train GCN model and extract the gradient
of pairwise nodes based on the adversarial network. Then we
calculate the momentum of gradient based on the gradients
of previous iterations. By finding the the pair of nodes with
maximum absolute momentum, we update the original net-
work iteratively and generate the adversarial network. In the
experiment we not only do uniform attack, hub-node attack
and bridge-node attack on three network embedding methods,
but also do community deception to to verify that MGA is
not only useful for node classification attacks. Besides, We
also consider the case of limited knowledge, and MGA is still
successful.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work is partially supported by Zhejiang Natural Sci-
ence Foundation (LY19F020025), Science and Technology In-
novation 2025 (2018B10063), the Special Scientific Research
Fund of Basic Public Welfare Profession of Zhejiang Province
(LGF20F020016).
REFERENCES
[1] W. Chen and S.-H. Teng, “Interplay between social influence and
network centrality: A comparative study on shapley centrality and single-
node-influence centrality,” in Proceedings of the 26th International
Conference on World Wide Web. International World Wide Web
Conferences Steering Committee, 2017, pp. 967–976.
[2] C. Ding, F. Xia, G. Gopalakrishnan, W. Qian, and A. Zhou, “Teamgen:
An interactive team formation system based on professional social
network,” in International Conference on World Wide Web Companion,
2017, pp. 195–199.
[3] Q. Xuan, Z.-Y. Zhang, C. Fu, H.-X. Hu, and V. Filkov, “Social synchrony
on complex networks,” IEEE transactions on cybernetics, vol. 48, no. 5,
pp. 1420–1431, 2018.
[4] H. Huang, X. Shao, Y. Xie, T. Wang, Y. Zhang, X. Wang, and X. Deng,
“An integrated genomic regulatory network of virulence-related tran-
scriptional factors in pseudomonas aeruginosa,” Nature communications,
vol. 10, no. 1, p. 2931, 2019.
[5] K. B. Muchowska, S. J. Varma, and J. Moran, “Synthesis and breakdown
of universal metabolic precursors promoted by iron,” Nature, vol. 569,
no. 7754, p. 104, 2019.
[6] K. An, Y.-C. Chiu, X. Hu, and X. Chen, “A network partitioning
algorithmic approach for macroscopic fundamental diagram-based hier-
archical traffic network management,” IEEE Transactions on Intelligent
Transportation Systems, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 1130–1139, 2017.
[7] X. Zhang and S. Mahadevan, “A bio-inspired approach to traffic network
equilibrium assignment problem,” IEEE transactions on cybernetics,
vol. 48, no. 4, pp. 1304–1315, 2017.
9TABLE VI: The attack effects on community detection, in terms of ASR and AML, obtained by different attack methods on
various network embedding methods and multiple datasets. Here, ASR is obtained by changing 20 links.
Dataset NEM
ASR (%) AML
MGA FGA MGA FGA
Unlimited Direct Indirect Unlimited Direct Indirect Unlimited Direct Indirect Unlimited Direct Indirect
PloBook
DeepWalk 100 98.55 56.06 93.55 88.64 22.95 5.33 7.28 13.83 7.84 8.70 18.33
node2vec 100 97.06 69.23 92.06 90.26 19.05 5.12 7.41 12.55 8.68 9.01 18.41
GraphGAN 100 95.65 66.67 93.65 89.21 17.46 5.31 7.54 13.20 8.32 8.34 18.63
LPA 100 97.37 60.53 96.37 95.36 24.35 5.24 5.31 13.42 5.94 6.03 18.21
Louvain 100 94.74 55.26 98.38 94.12 21.10 5.86 6.05 13.62 5.91 6.39 18.38
Average 100 96.67 61.55 94.80 91.52 20.98 5.37 6.72 13.32 7.34 7.69 18.39
Dolphin
DeepWalk 100 100 72.22 100 100 68.18 3.52 4.22 13.21 3.64 4.39 13.45
node2vec 100 100 68.42 100 100 63.64 3.41 4.09 13.83 3.41 4.25 14.00
GraphGAN 100 100 57.89 100 96.57 50.00 3.94 4.31 14.26 4.00 4.61 14.50
LPA 100 100 57.89 100 100 55.78 3.75 3.90 13.21 3.82 3.98 13.42
Louvain 100 100 63.16 100 98.54 58.86 4.21 4.21 12.53 4.02 4.32 13.86
Average 100 100 63.92 100 99.02 59.29 100 100 63.92 100 99.02 59.29
[8] J. Gao, F. Liang, W. Fan, Y. Sun, and J. Han, “Graph-based consensus
maximization among multiple supervised and unsupervised models,” in
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 2009, pp. 585–593.
[9] L. Jian, J. Li, and H. Liu, “Toward online node classification on
streaming networks,” Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery, vol. 32,
no. 1, pp. 231–257, 2018.
[10] S. Ping, D. Liu, B. Yang, Y. Zhu, H. Chen, and Z. Wang, “Batch mode
active learning for node classification in assortative and disassortative
networks,” IEEE Access, vol. 6, pp. 4750–4758, 2018.
[11] J. Cheng, X. Wu, M. Zhou, S. Gao, Z. Huang, and C. Liu, “A novel
method for detecting new overlapping community in complex evolv-
ing networks,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics:
Systems, no. 99, pp. 1–13, 2018.
[12] P. Govindan, C. Wang, C. Xu, H. Duan, and S. Soundarajan, “The k-peak
decomposition: Mapping the global structure of graphs,” in Proceedings
of the 26th International Conference on World Wide Web. International
World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee, 2017, pp. 1441–
1450.
[13] J. Cheng, W. Xiao, M. Zhou, S. Gao, and L. Cong, “A novel method for
detecting new overlapping community in complex evolving networks,”
IEEE Transactions on Systems Man and Cybernetics Systems, vol. PP,
no. 99, pp. 1–13, 2018.
[14] C. Fu, M. Zhao, L. Fan, X. Chen, J. Chen, Z. Wu, Y. Xia, and Q. Xuan,
“Link weight prediction using supervised learning methods and its
application to yelp layered network,” IEEE Transactions on Knowledge
and Data Engineering, 2018.
[15] A. Pecli, M. C. Cavalcanti, and R. Goldschmidt, “Automatic feature
selection for supervised learning in link prediction applications: a
comparative study,” Knowledge and Information Systems, vol. 56, no. 1,
pp. 85–121, 2018.
[16] Y. Cen, J. Zhang, G. Wang, Y. Qian, C. Meng, Z. Dai, H. Yang, and
J. Tang, “Trust relationship prediction in alibaba e-commerce platform,”
IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, 2019.
[17] I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy, “Explaining and harnessing
adversarial examples (2014),” arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572.
[18] C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, J. Bruna, D. Erhan, I. Goodfellow,
and R. Fergus, “Intriguing properties of neural networks,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1312.6199, 2013.
[19] N. Akhtar and A. Mian, “Threat of adversarial attacks on deep learning
in computer vision: A survey,” IEEE Access, vol. 6, pp. 14 410–14 430,
2018.
[20] F. Trame`r, N. Papernot, I. Goodfellow, D. Boneh, and P. McDaniel,
“The space of transferable adversarial examples,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1704.03453, 2017.
[21] E. Yang, T. Liu, C. Deng, and D. Tao, “Adversarial examples for
hamming space search,” IEEE transactions on cybernetics, 2018.
[22] S.-M. Moosavi-Dezfooli, A. Fawzi, and P. Frossard, “Deepfool: a simple
and accurate method to fool deep neural networks,” in Proceedings of the
IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2016,
pp. 2574–2582.
[23] G. F. Elsayed, S. Shankar, B. Cheung, N. Papernot, A. Kurakin,
I. Goodfellow, and J. Sohl-Dickstein, “Adversarial examples that fool
both human and computer vision,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.08195,
2018.
[24] Q.-Z. Cai, M. Du, C. Liu, and D. Song, “Curriculum adversarial
training,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1805.04807, 2018.
[25] Y. Duan, Z. Zhao, L. Bu, and F. Song, “Things you may not know
about adversarial example: A black-box adversarial image attack,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1905.07672, 2019.
[26] J. Tang, X. Du, X. He, F. Yuan, Q. Tian, and T.-S. Chua, “Adversarial
training towards robust multimedia recommender system,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, 2019.
[27] M. Fang, G. Yang, N. Z. Gong, and J. Liu, “Poisoning attacks to
graph-based recommender systems,” in Proceedings of the 34th Annual
Computer Security Applications Conference. ACM, 2018, pp. 381–392.
[28] A. Bojcheski and S. Gu¨nnemann, “Adversarial attacks on node embed-
dings,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.01093, 2018.
[29] H. Dai, H. Li, T. Tian, X. Huang, L. Wang, J. Zhu, and L. Song, “Adver-
sarial attack on graph structured data,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.02371,
2018.
[30] J. Chen, Y. Wu, X. Xu, Y. Chen, H. Zheng, and Q. Xuan, “Fast gradient
attack on network embedding,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.02797, 2018.
[31] S. Yu, M. Zhao, C. Fu, H. Huang, X. Shu, Q. Xuan, and G. Chen,
“Target defense against link-prediction-based attacks via evolutionary
perturbations,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.05912, 2018.
[32] D. Zu¨gner, A. Akbarnejad, and S. Gu¨nnemann, “Adversarial attacks
on neural networks for graph data,” in Proceedings of the 24th ACM
SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery & Data
Mining. ACM, 2018, pp. 2847–2856.
[33] B. T. Polyak, “Some methods of speeding up the convergence of iter-
ation methods,” USSR Computational Mathematics and Mathematical
Physics, vol. 4, no. 5, pp. 1–17, 1964.
[34] C. M. Bishop et al., Neural networks for pattern recognition. Oxford
university press, 1995.
[35] S. Haykin, Neural networks: a comprehensive foundation. Prentice
Hall PTR, 1994.
[36] B. D. Ripley and N. Hjort, Pattern recognition and neural networks.
Cambridge university press, 1996.
[37] S. Ruder, “An overview of gradient descent optimization algorithms,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1609.04747, 2016.
[38] A. A. Gorodetsky and J. D. Jakeman, “Gradient-based optimization for
regression in the functional tensor-train format,” Journal of Computa-
tional Physics, vol. 374, pp. 1219–1238, 2018.
[39] Y. Qiao, B. P. Lelieveldt, and M. Staring, “An efficient preconditioner
for stochastic gradient descent optimization of image registration,” IEEE
transactions on medical imaging, 2019.
[40] Y. Zhang, A. M. Saxe, M. S. Advani, and A. A. Lee, “Energy–entropy
competition and the effectiveness of stochastic gradient descent in
machine learning,” Molecular Physics, vol. 116, no. 21-22, pp. 3214–
3223, 2018.
[41] Y. Dong, F. Liao, T. Pang, H. Su, J. Zhu, X. Hu, and J. Li, “Boosting
adversarial attacks with momentum,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Con-
ference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2018, pp. 9185–
9193.
[42] B. Perozzi, R. Al-Rfou, and S. Skiena, “Deepwalk: Online learning
of social representations,” in Proceedings of the 20th ACM SIGKDD
international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining.
ACM, 2014, pp. 701–710.
[43] A. Grover and J. Leskovec, “node2vec: Scalable feature learning for
networks,” in Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGKDD international
conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining. ACM, 2016,
pp. 855–864.
10
[44] H. Wang, J. Wang, J. Wang, M. Zhao, W. Zhang, F. Zhang, X. Xie,
and M. Guo, “Graphgan: Graph representation learning with generative
adversarial nets,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1711.08267, 2017.
[45] S. Nagaraja, “The impact of unlinkability on adversarial community
detection: effects and countermeasures,” in International Symposium on
Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium. Springer, 2010, pp. 253–
272.
[46] M. Waniek, T. P. Michalak, M. J. Wooldridge, and T. Rahwan, “Hiding
individuals and communities in a social network,” Nature Human
Behaviour, vol. 2, no. 2, p. 139, 2018.
[47] V. Fionda and G. Pirro, “Community deception or: How to stop fearing
community detection algorithms,” IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and
Data Engineering, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 660–673, 2018.
[48] J. Chen, L. Chen, Y. Chen, M. Zhao, S. Yu, Q. Xuan, and X. Yang,
“Ga-based q-attack on community detection,” IEEE Transactions on
Computational Social Systems, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 491–503, 2019.
[49] E. Zheleva and L. Getoor, “Preserving the privacy of sensitive relation-
ships in graph data,” in Privacy, security, and trust in KDD. Springer,
2008, pp. 153–171.
[50] A. M. Fard, K. Wang, and P. S. Yu, “Limiting link disclosure in social
network analysis through subgraph-wise perturbation,” in Proceedings of
the 15th International Conference on Extending Database Technology.
ACM, 2012, pp. 109–119.
[51] A. M. Fard and K. Wang, “Neighborhood randomization for link privacy
in social network analysis,” World Wide Web, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 9–32,
2015.
[52] Q. Xuan, J. Zheng, L. Chen, S. Yu, J. Chen, D. Zhang, and Q. Z. Mem-
ber, “Unsupervised euclidean distance attack on network embedding,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.11015, 2019.
[53] T. N. Kipf and M. Welling, “Semi-supervised classification with graph
convolutional networks,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1609.02907, 2016.
[54] L. A. Adamic and N. Glance, “The political blogosphere and the 2004
us election: divided they blog,” in Proceedings of the 3rd international
workshop on Link discovery. ACM, 2005, pp. 36–43.
[55] A. K. McCallum, K. Nigam, J. Rennie, and K. Seymore, “Automating
the construction of internet portals with machine learning,” Information
Retrieval, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 127–163, 2000.
[56] H. Dai, B. Dai, and L. Song, “Discriminative embeddings of latent
variable models for structured data,” in International conference on
machine learning, 2016, pp. 2702–2711.
[57] L. C. Freeman, “Centrality in social networks conceptual clarification,”
Social networks, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 215–239, 1978.
[58] Y. Yustiawan, W. Maharani, and A. A. Gozali, “Degree centrality
for social network with opsahl method,” Procedia Computer Science,
vol. 59, pp. 419–426, 2015.
[59] A. Shimbel, “Structural parameters of communication networks,” The
bulletin of mathematical biophysics, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 501–507, 1953.
[60] A. Bavelas, “A mathematical model for group structures,” Applied
anthropology, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 16–30, 1948.
[61] T. Opsahl, F. Agneessens, and J. Skvoretz, “Node centrality in weighted
networks: Generalizing degree and shortest paths,” Social networks,
vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 245–251, 2010.
[62] S. P. Borgatti, “Centrality and network flow,” Social networks, vol. 27,
no. 1, pp. 55–71, 2005.
[63] M. E. Newman and M. Girvan, “Finding and evaluating community
structure in networks,” Physical review E, vol. 69, no. 2, p. 026113,
2004.
[64] M. Newman, “Community detection in networks: Modularity opti-
mization and maximum likelihood are equivalent,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1606.02319, 2016.
[65] U. N. Raghavan, R. Albert, and S. Kumara, “Near linear time algorithm
to detect community structures in large-scale networks,” Physical review
E, vol. 76, no. 3, p. 036106, 2007.
[66] V. D. Blondel, J.-L. Guillaume, R. Lambiotte, and E. Lefebvre, “Fast
unfolding of communities in large networks,” Journal of statistical
mechanics: theory and experiment, vol. 2008, no. 10, p. P10008, 2008.
[67] M. E. Newman, “Modularity and community structure in networks,”
Proceedings of the national academy of sciences, vol. 103, no. 23, pp.
8577–8582, 2006.
[68] D. Lusseau, K. Schneider, O. J. Boisseau, P. Haase, E. Slooten, and S. M.
Dawson, “The bottlenose dolphin community of doubtful sound features
a large proportion of long-lasting associations,” Behavioral Ecology and
Sociobiology, vol. 54, no. 4, pp. 396–405, 2003.
[69] L. v. d. Maaten and G. Hinton, “Visualizing data using t-sne,” Journal
of machine learning research, vol. 9, no. Nov, pp. 2579–2605, 2008.
[70] M. E. Newman, “Fast algorithm for detecting community structure in
networks,” Physical review E, vol. 69, no. 6, p. 066133, 2004.
